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INTRODUCTION to Gottfried Leibniz's Monadology
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig on
July 1, 1646, son of a philosophy professor who died
when Gottfried was only six. He studied law at Leipzig
University, who refused him a degree for being so young
(he was only twenty-two), but was offered a
professorship at Altdorf. He declined, and went on to
spend much of his life in the service of the Dukes of
Hanover. As engineer he worked on clocks, mining
machinery and built a calculator. As librarian he began
the modern method of cataloguing. As a physicist he
studied momentum. He possibly invented geology as a
science. And as a mathematician he discovered the
differential calculus (independently of Isaac Newton),
where finding the area of an object is done by dividing
it up into an infinite number of 'slices' and then
adding them together, an idea which is reflected in his
concept of a universe made up of infinitesimal 'Monads'.
Yet Leibniz was not a popular man, only his secretary
attended his funeral.
THE VERY
SQUASHED VERSION
All the plenum of the universe is entirely filled
with tiny Monads, which cannot fail, have no constituent
parts and have no windows through which anything could
come in or go out. Every Monad is different and is
continuously changing. All simple substances or Monads
might be called Entelechies, for they have in them a
certain perfection and a certain self-sufficiency. As
they have some perception and desire, they may be called
souls, but animal Souls are accompnied by memory. In
dreamless sleep our soul is like a Monad. The knowledge
of necessary and eternal truths distinguishes us from
the animals and gives us Reason. Truths of reasoning are
necessary and their opposite is impossible: truths of
fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When
a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by
analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and
truths. The final reason of things must be in a
necessary substance, which we call God. God holds an
infinity of ideas, and chooses the most perfect ones.
Each simple substance has relations which express all
the others, and, consequently, that it is a perpetual
living mirror of the universe; though it represents more
distinctly the body of which it is the entelechy. Each
portion of matter is like a pond full of fishes, where
each drop of its liquid parts is also another pond. Thus
there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead
in the universe. All the parts of every living body are
full of other living beings, each with its dominant
entelechy or soul. Thus there never is absolute birth
nor complete death. Minds are images of the Deity,
capable of knowing the system of the universe, each
being like a small divinity in its own sphere. Whence
the totality of all spirits must compose the City of
God, where no good action would be unrewarded and no bad
one unpunished. If we could understand the order of the
universe, we should find that it exceeds the desires of
the wisest men.
ABOUT
THIS SQUASHED VERSION
The original Monadology is itself a
condensed and abridged summary of ideas, reputedly
prepared by Leibniz for Prince Eugene of Savoy.
Originally written in French, which was not Leibniz's
native tongue and which he handled rather poorly, it has
been translated by Robert Latta in 1898, George
Montgomery in 1902, George MacDonald Ross in 1999, Paul
and Anne Martin Schrecker in 1965 and Mary Morris in
1934. This version is largely based on the original
Robert Latta translation, with some revisions from
Jonathan F. Bennett's version of 2004.
GLOSSARY
Accident: A necessary state of
affairs, a happening (without the modern implication of
misfortune).
Animalcule: A tiny animal. It was once
thought that seeds, sperm and embryos contained a minute
version of the final animal.
Appetition: The internal principle
which prepares for change; rudimentary "desire".
Axiom: A primary principle, which
cannot and need not be proven
Autarcheia: Self sufficiency
Compound: A collection (aggregatum) of
simple things
Contingent truth: A truth whose
opposite is possible
Entelechy: Something having in it "a
certain perfection", a completeness- a term taken from
Aristotle's definition of the soul
God: The underlying reason of things
Grace: The unmerited favour of God.
Monad: The simple substance
Plenum: A completely filled space.
Postulate: A primary principle, which
cannot and need not be proven
Substance: A being that subsists by
itself; a separate or distinct thing.
Simple ideas: Ideas of which no
definition can be given
Window: Way in or out
Monadology
by
Gottfried Leibniz,
Squashed version edited by
Glyn
Hughes
© 2005
1. The
Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but the
simple substance, that which makes up all compounds. By
'simple' is meant 'without parts.'
3. These Monads are the real atoms of nature, which make
up things.
4. Monads cannot fail. No simple substance can be
destroyed by natural means.
5. Neither can any truly simple substance come into
being by being formed from the combination of parts.
7. Monads have no window, through which anything could
come in or go out. Neither substance nor accident can
come into a Monad from outside.
8. Yet Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they
would not exist.
9. Each Monad must be different from every other. For in
nature there are never two beings perfectly alike.
10. Every Monad is continuously changing.
11. Thus changes in Monads must come from their internal
principle, since nothing external can influence their
inner being.
12. Besides the principle of the change, there must be a
particular series of changes, which constitutes the
specific nature of the simple substances.
13. Every change takes place over some period of time.
14. The brief condition in which many things are
represented within the simple substance may be called
Perception, which is dimmer than Apperception or
Consciousness. Descartes is defective, for he treats as
non-existent those perceptions of which we are not
consciously aware. This has led many to believe that
that there are no souls in animals. Like the uneducated
crowd, they have confused a coma and death, and fallen
into the old prejudices of souls entirely separate from
bodies and of souls being mortal.
15. The internal principle which produces the change
from one perception to another may be called Appetition.
17. Supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to
think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived
as a mill. But, on examining its interior, we should
find only parts which work one upon another, and never
anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in
a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a
machine, that perception must be sought for.
18. All simple substances or created Monads might be
called Entelechies, for they have in them a certain
perfection (echousi to enteles); and a certain
self-sufficiency (autarkeia) which makes them the
sources of their internal activities and, so to speak,
incorporeal automata.
19. If we are to give the name of Soul to everything
which has perceptions and desires, then all simple
substances or created Monads might be called souls; but
as feeling is more than a bare perception, I think that
the name of Monads or Entelechies should be given to
simple substances which have perception only, and that
the name of Souls should be given to those in which
perception is accompanied by memory.
20. When we swoon or fall into dreamless sleep, our soul
does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad.
22. And as every present state of a simple substance is
naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such
a way that its present is pregnant with its future;
23. And as, on waking from stupor, we are conscious of
our perceptions, we must have had perceptions
immediately before we awoke; for one perception can come
only from another perception, as a motion can come only
from motion.
25. We see also that nature has given heightened
perceptions to animals, from the care she has taken to
provide them with organs, which collect rays of light,
or undulations of the air.
26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of
consecutiveness. For instance, when a stick is shown to
dogs, they remember the pain it has caused them, and
howl and run away.
29. But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal
truths that distinguishes us from the mere animals and
gives us Reason and the sciences, raising us to the
knowledge of ourselves and of God. And it is this in us
that is called the rational soul or mind.
30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary
truths, and through their abstract expression, that we
rise to acts of reflexion, which make us think of what
is called I. And these acts of reflexion furnish the
chief objects of our reasonings.
31. Our reasonings are grounded upon two great
principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we
judge false that which involves a contradiction, and
true that which is opposed to the false;
32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we
hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no
statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason
33. There are also two kinds of truths, those of
reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are
necessary and their opposite is impossible: truths of
fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When
a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by
analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and
truths, until we come to those which are primary.
34. Thus in Mathematics speculative Theorems are reduced
by analysis to Definitions, Axioms and Postulates.
35. In short, there are simple ideas or primary
principles of which no definition can be given and which
cannot be proved, and indeed have no need of proof;
whose opposite involves an express contradiction.
38. Thus the final reason of things must be in a
necessary substance, which we call God.
42. It follows also that created beings derive their
perfections from the influence of God, but that their
imperfections come from their own nature.
48. In God there is Power, Knowledge, whose content is
the variety of the ideas, and Will, which makes changes
or products according to the principle of the best.
49. A created thing is said to act on other things in so
far as it has perfection, and to suffer to be itself
acted upon in so far as it is imperfect. Thus activity
is attributed to a Monad, in so far as it has distinct
perceptions, and passivity in so far as its perceptions
are confused.
50. And one created thing is more perfect than another,
in this, that there is found in the more perfect that
which serves to explain a priori what takes place in the
less perfect, and it is on this account that the former
is said to act upon the latter.
51. But in simple substances the influence of one Monad
upon another can have its effect only through the
mediation of God.
53. Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite
number of possible universes, and as only one of them
can be actual, there must be a sufficient reason for God
to decide upon one thing rather than another.
54. And this reason can be found only in the fitness or
in the degrees of perfection.
56. Now the connexion of all created things to each and
of each to all, means that each simple substance has
relations which express all the others, and,
consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of
the universe.
57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides,
appears quite different; so from the point of view of
each Monad it is as if there were so many different
universes.
58. And by this means there is obtained as great variety
as possible, and as much perfection as possible.
61. All is a plenum (and thus all matter is connected
together) and in the plenum every motion has an effect
upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so
that each body not only is affected by those which are
in contact with it and in some way feels the effect of
everything that happens to them, but also is affected by
bodies adjoining itself. This inter-communication of
things extends to any distance, however great. And
consequently every body feels the effect of all that
takes place in the universe, so that he who sees all
might read in each what is happening everywhere, and
even what has happened or shall happen, observing in the
present that which is far off as well in time as in
place. But a soul can read in itself only that which is
there represented distinctly; it cannot all at once
unroll everything.
62. Thus, although each created Monad represents the
whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body
which specially pertains to it, and of which it is the
entelechy.
63. The Monad which is the entelechy or soul of a living
body is, like every Monad, a mirror of the universe, and
as the universe is ruled according to a perfect order,
there must also be an extent to which that perfection is
represented in the soul.
64. Thus the organic body of a living being is a kind of
divine machine, which infinitely surpasses all
artificial automata. For a machine made by men is not a
machine in each of its parts. But the machines of
nature, living bodies, are still machines in their
smallest parts ad infinitum. It is this that constitutes
the difference between the skill of nature and craft
skill, that is to say, between the divine art and ours.
65. Each portion of matter is not only divisible to
infinity, as the ancients realised, but is actually
sub-divided without end, of which each has some motion
of its own.
66. Whence it appears that in the smallest particle of
matter there is a world of creatures, living beings,
animals, entelechies, souls.
67. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a
garden full of plants and like a pond full of fishes.
But each branch of every plant, each member of every
animal, each drop of its liquid parts is also some such
garden or pond.
68. And though the earth and the air which are between
the plants of the garden, or the water which is between
the fish of the pond, be neither plant nor fish; yet
they also contain plants and fishes, but mostly so
minute as to be imperceptible to us.
69. Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile,
nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion
save in appearance, somewhat as it might appear to be in
a pond at a distance.
70. Hence it appears that each living body has a
dominant entelechy, which in an animal is the soul; but
the members of this living body are full of other living
beings, plants, animals, each of which has also its
dominant entelechy or soul.
73. It follows from this that there never is absolute
birth [generation] nor complete death. What we call
births [generations] are developments and growths, while
what we call deaths are envelopments and diminutions.
74. Philosophers have been much perplexed about the
origin of forms. But nowadays it is become known,
through careful studies of plants and animals, that the
organic bodies of nature are never products of chaos or
putrefaction, but always come from seeds, in which there
was undoubtedly some being already formed; and it is
held that not only the organic body was already there
before conception, but also a soul in this body, and, in
short, the animal itself. Something like this is seen
apart from birth, as when worms become flies and
caterpillars become butterflies.
77. Thus it may be said that not only the soul, being a
mirror of an indestructible universe, is indestructible,
but also the animal itself.
78. These principles have given me a way of explaining
the union or rather the mutual agreement [conformite] of
the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own
laws, and the body likewise follows its own laws; and
they agree with each other in virtue of the
pre-established harmony between all substances, since
they are all representations of one and the same
universe.
81. According to this system bodies act as if (to
suppose the impossible) there were no souls, and souls
act as if there were no bodies, and both act as if each
influenced the other.
82. Thus, animals and souls come into being when the
world begins and no more come to an end that the world
does. The spermatic animalcules have merely ordinary
souls; but when those which are chosen through
conception, their sensuous souls are raised to the rank
of reason.
83. Minds are also images of the Deity or Author of
nature Himself, capable of knowing the system of the
universe, and to some extent of imitating it, each being
like a small divinity in its own sphere.
84. It is this that enables spirits [or minds- esprits]
to enter into a kind of fellowship with God.
85. Whence the totality of all spirits must compose the
City of God, that is to say, the most perfect State that
is possible.
86. This City of God is a moral world in the natural
world.
88. A result of this harmony is that things lead to
grace by the very ways of nature, and that this globe,
for instance, must be destroyed and renewed by natural
means at the very time when the government of spirits
requires it, for the punishment of some and the reward
of others.
90. Under this perfect government no good action would
be unrewarded and no bad one unpunished. This it is
which leads wise and virtuous people to devote their
energies to everything which appears in harmony with the
presumptive or antecedent will of God, and yet makes
them content with what God actually brings to pass by
His secret will. If we could sufficiently understand the
order of the universe, we should find that it exceeds
all the desires of the wisest men, and that it is
impossible to make it better than it is, not only as a
whole and in general but also for ourselves in
particular. It is this attachment to the Author of all
which can alone make our happiness.
Gottfried Leibniz
1646-1716
Liebniz's grave at Die Neustaedter Hof und Stadtkirche
St. Johannis, Hanover.
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